



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A LETTER

ON

THE RAMBLER, AND THE HOME AND FOREIGN REVIEW.

ADDRESSED TO THE

CLERGY OF THE DIOCESE OF BIRMINGHAM.

BY

THE RIGHT REV. BISHOP ULLATHORNE.

LONDON:

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A LETTER

ON

THE RAMBLER AND THE HOME AND FOREIGN REVIEW.

My Reverend Brethren,

There has been prevalent for some time past, amongst the Catholics of this country, an uneasy feeling respecting the course pursued by a Periodical, which professes to be an expositor of Catholic principles and sentiments. You will at once understand that I refer to the Rambler, which has recently taken the new form and title of "The Home and Foreign Review." Time has been when, under judicious control, this Periodical has done useful service to religion; but, of recent years, it has manifested a spirit, not always calculated to inspire confidence with its Catholic readers, and there is in the number just issued from the press, an article which shows, that the spirit complained of remains unchanged.

Often has the question been asked, why those, whose office it is to watch over Catholic teaching, gave no voice, warning the faithful of the dubious paths pursued by certain of its writers, and cautioning them against imbibing the poison cast up in their essays. But you, Reverend Brethren, well know, that if the shepherds are watchful of what passes within the fold, they are also considerate; and that, with the charity of their holy office, they patiently use the sources of private representation in their power, before, on the failure of these, they speak with open voice. The Cardinal Archbishop has at length been necessitated to characterize the Periodical in question, whilst formally addressing his clergy, in the following language:—"But this can hardly excite surprise in us who know the antecedents of that journal under another name. The absence for years of all reserve or reverence in its treatment of persons or of things deemed sacred, its grazing

ever the very edges of the most perilous abysses of error, and its habitual preferences of uncatholic to Catholic instincts, tendencies, and motives. In uttering these sad thoughts, and entreating you to warn your people, and especially the young, against such dangerous leadership, believe me, I am only obeying a higher direction than my own impulses, and acting under more solemn sanctions. Nor shall I stand alone in this unhappy necessary correction."

After words so solemn, expressed with so much reluctance, and measured with so much reserve, I naturally looked to the article under the designation of "Cardinal Wiseman and the Home and Foreign Review," which appeared in the Number just published, for some clear intimation of a change of course on the part of the directors of the Review. But I confess my disappointment. They tell us, they have no reason to doubt that the majority of the Bishops "share the Cardinal's view, which is also that of a large portion both of the rest of the clergy and also of the laity; and whatever may have been the precise action which has been taken in the matter, it is unquestionable that a very formidable mass of ecclesiastical authority and popular feeling is united against certain principles or opinions, which, whether rightly or wrongly, are attributed to them." They even admit that an impression so general cannot be supposed to be entirely founded on a mistake. Nor do they conceal from their readers their having reason to suppose that certain papers or propositions have undergone the revision of a higher authority than exists in this country, and that those extracts, or some of them, have been characterised by the Prefect of Propaganda "in terms which correspond to the Cardinal's language." *

Yet whilst the directors declare that the foundation of their Review is a humble faith in the infallible teaching of the Catholic Church, devotion to her cause, and attachment to her authority; and that, if any passage can be found which is contrary to that doctrine, incompatible with that devotion, or disrespectful to that authority, they sincerely retract and lament it; they equally declare that they have not consciously admitted any such passage "into the pages either of the late Rambler or of this Review. Errors in judgment, or errors of fact, they may have committed, but only such as are unavoidable." †

It is in this manner that the conductors of the Review reply

* Home and Foreign Review, October 1862, p. 509.

† P. 510.

to the "formidable mass of ecclesiastical authority and popular feeling," which they confess, is united against the principles or opinions attributed to them. They appeal to their unconsciousness of grave error in any passage. If such passage can be found, they are disposed to retract. And yet they proceed in this very article to restate some of their most unpleasant opinions and unapproved principles. They take to themselves the arena of ethics, science and literature on the express ground that they are beyond the office of the clergy, and are so injudiciously treated by them as to injure the cause of religion. And they lay down the principle, that even religious interests must yield to the principles of science and of politics. After pointing out that "the peculiar mission of the Church is to be the channel of grace to each soul by her spiritual and pastoral action;" to govern and educate so far as these offices "are subsidiaries to her great work of saving souls," and by her intellectual labour to seek "fuller knowledge of the works, the ideas, and the nature of God," that is, to pursue the study of theology—we are told that "the ethical and intellectual offices of the Church, as distinct from her spiritual office, are not hers exclusively or peculiarly." Not even peculiarly, says the Review, for—

"The Church cannot perform all these functions by herself; nor, consequently, can she absorb their direction. The political and intellectual orders remain permanently distinct from the spiritual. They follow their own ends, they obey their own laws, and in doing so they support the cause of religion by the discovery of truth and the upholding of right. They render this service by fulfilling their own ends independently and unrestrictedly, not by surrendering them for the sake of spiritual interests. Whatever diverts government and science from their own spheres, or leads religion to usurp their domains, confounds distinct authorities, and imperils not only political right and scientific truth, but also the cause of faith and morals."*

This is plainly put, and cannot easily be mistaken, especially when taken with the context, and it but condenses the expression of a principle which has pervaded this Periodical for a long time past. The Church is fairly warned off the ground of social morals and science as beyond her peculiar sphere; as, in fact, the sphere of the men of the world, and of this Review. She is told that when she touches these things, she mars what she touches, and that religion, by usurping their domains, "imperils not only political right and scientific truth,

* P. 511.

but also the cause of faith and morals." Spiritual supremacy is given to the Church, whilst ethical and intellectual supremacy is assigned to the world; they are "permanently distinct from the spiritual order." Of course the writers being Catholics, look to ethics, politics and science as they should be cultivated by Catholics. And the question arises, how far the Catholic can "uphold right," seek the good of society, or investigate the principles of truth, apart from his conscience, and away from the direction of his religion. The very source of the misery of the age in which we live is this, that so many intellectual men think and speculate without God, without subjection to His light and grace; and that so many intellectual theories are proclaimed which are destructive of faith and morals, and proclaimed on the express assertion that policy and science are independent of religion. But no Catholic is ignorant of the great truth that Christ will judge all our thoughts, words and works, and that consequently they are amenable to Christ. Nor is it possible, in the nature of things, that a soul thoroughly imbued with the spirit of religion can sever his political or *ethical* from his religious conscience, or his scientific from his religious thinking, and hold them apart as though they dwelt in separate souls.

The history of religion, from the beginning of the world, is the refutation of the principle, that severs the offices of religion from its connexion with social and scientific pursuits. God never yet spoke to man without demanding the service of the whole man, mind, heart, and faculties; without demanding that his whole life—a love extending to the entire compass of his mind and strength, should be given to his Creator. The morals of social and political life are as much a part of the conscience and responsibility of a Christian man as those of private life, and they rest in his case upon the same Christian principles. It is impossible to imagine any order of human responsibility which can "remain distinct from the spiritual order." It is the light of faith which makes man doubly responsible to God for the use of his light of reason, and it is this responsibility which forbids his employing his reason apart from his faith.

If it be upon principle that the conductors of the Review maintain that the influence of religion is injurious to "the upholding of right," what will they say of Moses, and of Solomon, when God was with him? What will they say of the Theocracy which God instituted under the Old Law? And what, on the other side, will they say of the ethical and philosophical condition of the world without Christ? What

will they say of St. Paul forbidding his disciples from the law courts of the Gentiles? And what will they say of the Bishops of the Christian world whom Constantine found in the habit of exercising a magistracy over Christian litigants from Apostolic times? What will they say of the history of European civilization; and of the fact, attested by Guizot, that the Catholic Bishops formed the governments and framed the constitutions of Europe? What, for example, can be said of that line of Prelates who framed and administered the King's Chancery in England? What of those Popes who for so many ages were the arbiters and guides of the public law of Christendom? And, as dutiful sons of the Church, what do they say of those recent Popes who, in formal documents, have so loudly and energetically, condemned the doctrines which separate the political or *ethical* order from the law and inspiration of the Catholic conscience? And if this principle necessitates the severance of the spiritual from the intellectual functions, what can the authors of it say to the Church when she constituted and guided the Universities of the Catholic world? or to the Benedictines who saved the science and letters of the old world for the new? or to the Jesuits who carried the arts and sciences of Europe into China? or to the indefatigable missionaries who, at this hour, are civilizing the savages of every clime?

The Rambler wearied us with the incident of Galileo, the specific argument for his case, whatever be its value, yet forgot that Copernicus was a priest, who pursued his discoveries whilst canon of a Cathedral; and that it was by command of a Pope that Roger Bacon wrote the account of his discoveries, and of the principles that guided his investigations.

But the directors of the Review will say that I have not completely seized their idea, that there is a second principle which must be construed with the first. No one who has read much of the Rambler can be ignorant of that principle. And the Review reasserts it as their primary reply to Cardinal Wiseman's admonition. They say:—

“The principles of religion, government, and science, are in harmony, always and absolutely; but their interests are not. And though all other interests must yield to those of religion, no principle can succumb to any interest. A political law or a scientific truth may be perilous to the morals or the faith of individuals; but it cannot on this ground be resisted by the Church. It may, at times, be the duty of the State to protect freedom of conscience; yet this freedom may be a temptation to apostacy. A discovery may be made in science which will shake the faith of thousands; yet reli-

gion cannot refute it or object to it. The difference in this respect, between a true and a false religion is, that one judges all things by the standard of their truth, the other by the touchstone of its own interests." *

This is a moral theory that is utterly unknown in the teaching of the Church, and coming from the pen of those who are vindicating their attachment to the Church, it sounds as strange as it is certainly novel. There is a double fallacy in the argument, arising from the twofold sense in which the words *principle* and *interest* are severally used. All principles, whether they appertain to religion, policy, or science, are always and absolutely in harmony, as they exist at their fountain, in the mind of God. But who will say that they are always and absolutely in harmony as they exist in the mind of man? Yet the point in question refers to the co-ordinating of the principles of religion, policy, and science, in the mind of the individual man. In the case of a conflict of principles, which is to be subject to the other? Those of faith to those of reason, or those of reason to those of faith,—the light of man to the light of God, or the light of God to the light of the natural man. And as the Review professes for its foundation "a humble faith in the infallible teaching of the Church, a devotion to her cause which controls every other interest, and an attachment to her authority which no other influence can supplant;" whilst on the other hand, they say, that "though all other interests must yield to those of religion, no principle can succumb to any interest;" what sense are we to attach to the word *interest*? The whole context of the exposition, taken with the point to be elucidated, shows clearly that by *interest* is not meant the temporal advantages of Catholics, or even of the Church. What is here designated by the phrase,—the interest of the Church,—is in fact a moral principle; it expresses the claims which the Church holds, as the representative of God, to guide the minds of her children and to keep them in the truth. The end of a moral aim is the principle of that aim. And the end, object, or interest of the Church, is, in the language of St. Paul, to bring every soul into captivity to the truth and law of Christ, guarding them against "the profane novelties of words, and expositions of science, falsely so called." It is the fundamental principle of religion that we be in all things subject to God, and be directed by the infallible authority which He has commanded us to hear and

obey. And the interest or aim of the Church, the object of her striving, is to subject every mind and heart to God, who is the beginning and the end of all principles, whether they be of religion to know and love Him, or of policy to benefit His creatures, or of science to investigate His truths. To say then that no principle is to succumb to any interest, meaning by principle, the interest of policy and science, and by interest the principle of religion, and to add that this would be "a treachery to principle," is to say, that the inferior principle is not to be controlled by the higher principle, that reason is not to be controlled by faith, the mind of man by the mind of God.

To say, by way of applying this theory, that the Church cannot, that is ought not, to resist a political law that is perilous to the faith and morals of her children, is a proposition subversive of the Church and of the faith. It is to deny her prerogative of saving, at all hazards, the souls which Christ died for and committed to her trust. And it is derogatory to some of her greatest saints and of her most glorious martyrs. And to say that the Church cannot "refute or object to a discovery which will shake the faith of thousands;" meaning thereby to deny her right to examine that discovery after her own methods, and, by the union of science with faith in her theology, to ascertain whether and how far that discovery be true and accordant with the infallible Word of God, is to deny to the Church her mission to "prove all things," and, to "hold fast that which is good." It is to deny her the mission of teaching to "avoid oppositions of science falsely so called,"* and of protecting those thousands of souls from having their faith shaken by the erroneous deductions which men of science are too apt to draw from those real discoveries which can never conflict with faith. And what now becomes of the position laid down as the basis of this theory, that the principles of religion, policy, and science, are always and absolutely harmonious, if the principles of religion are not allowed to be applied as tests to social law and scientific discovery?

To classify the groups of men who at intervals for the last three hundred years have associated the defence of the Church with party interests of the time, will not serve the theory, unless it can be shown that they made the authority of the Church subordinate, and minor interests supreme, and that the Church herself approved of this. And in pointing out

* 1 Tim. vi. 19.

the varied temper evinced by the defenders of the Church at distinct epochs, whilst pursuing her vindication, it should be remembered that the Church is wise and charitable. There is a time to be silent and a time to speak. She acts not from that fear and pusillanimity which the Review thinks they see in her recent history; the Holy Ghost has given her the gift of fortitude and prudence—that prudence of the serpent joined with the simplicity of the dove which her blessed founder assigned to her.

I have delayed long upon this moral theory, because the conductors of the Review have set it forth as their reply to Cardinal Wiseman's grave remonstrance, and because they say that it is "the substance of those principles which shut out the Home and Foreign Review from the sympathies of a large portion of the body to which they belong."* But, before turning to other matters, I cannot omit drawing attention to the spirit which has long animated those writers towards the clergy of every rank and order. They are fond of giving lowering estimates of the mental and moral qualities of the teachers of the sanctuary. The article is wound up by a description of the clergy without distinction, and by an admonition addressed for their benefit, which plainly indicates, that, if the teaching Church is not to direct or admonish the votaries of "ethical and intellectual science," it does not follow that they are not to admonish the teaching Church.

"Great consideration," concludes the Review, "is due to those whose minds are not prepared for the full light of truth and the grave responsibilities of knowledge; who have not learned to distinguish what is divine from what is human—defined dogma from the atmosphere of opinion which surrounds it,—and who honour both with the same awful reverence. Great allowances are also due to those who are constantly labouring to nourish the spirit of belief in minds perplexed by difficulties, or darkened by ignorance and prejudice. Those men have not always the results of research at command; they have no time to keep abreast with the constant progress of historical and critical science; and the solutions which they are obliged to give are consequently often imperfect, and adapted only to uninstructed and uncultivated minds. Their reasoning cannot be the same as that of the scholar who has to meet error in its most vigorous, profound and ingenious form.....Men who are occupied in the special functions of ecclesiastical life, where the Church is all sufficient and requires no extraneous aid, will naturally see at first in the problems of public life, the demands of modern society, and the progress of human learning, nothing but new and

unwelcome difficulties,—trials and distractions to themselves, temptation and danger to their flocks. In time, they will learn that there is a higher and nobler cause for Catholics than one which begins in fear and does not lead to security. They will come to see how vast a service they may render to the Church by vindicating for themselves a place in every movement that promotes the study of God's works and the advancement of mankind. They will remember that, while the office of ecclesiastical authority is to tolerate, to warn, and to guide, that of religious intelligence and zeal is not to leave the intellectual work of intellectual and social civilization to be the monopoly and privilege of others, but to save it from debasement by giving it for leaders the children, not the enemies, of the Church. And at length, in the progress of political right and scientific knowledge, in the development of freedom in the state and of truth in literature, they will recognise one of the first among their human duties and the highest of their earthly rewards.”*

In this parting with Cardinal Wiseman, and the Bishops and clergy who think with him, in this admonition in retort for that of their spiritual superior, in this *Homilia ad Clerum* given from the serene heights of science, do not, my Rev. Brethren, imagine that we are to be restored to those “ethical and intellectual” pursuits, which have been so emphatically declared to be “permanently distinct from the spiritual order” of things. What we are really exhorted to do, is to give them “for leaders the children, not the enemies, of the Church.”

But what if, philosophising in the “full light of truth, and the grave responsibilities of knowledge,” the very foundation of faith be sapped? Then assuredly it is our duty not “to tolerate,” but “to warn and to guide” the faithful from that light, and to point out the errors to their authors. I do not propose to give the sum but only samples of those errors; and to them I now address your attention. I turn first, then, to two Articles published last year in the Rambler, on Reason and Faith.† And here, on the threshold, I meet with a preparing of the mind of the reader, which consists in eliminating his confidence from the legitimate teachers of the Church. The first Article opens with these amongst other remarks:—

“The opposition to religion is, in many quarters, only an opposition to the men who claim to govern in the name of religion, and who have been content with their title, without seeking to qualify themselves for the duties which it implies.....Not only among the unlettered, whose prejudices may be excused, but among those

* P. 519—20.

† Numbers of July and September, 1861.

who have received a liberal education, and might be supposed to know the mind of the Church, there may be found men who import all kinds of exploded fancies into the circle of the sciences, and who resolutely denounce all new discoveries, on the ground of the supreme authority of Scripture and tradition."

And, after observing that the theologian must discourse about the realities of his science in terms of phenomena, because thought must be expressed through images derived from phenomena, the writer adds :—

"Divines have supposed that because the science of nature is the quarry whence they take their stores, that therefore they have a right to control its progress, and to judge of its conclusions. 'The faith,' they say, 'is the foundation of all sciences.' Therefore all sciences must derive their first principles from the faith, and must be controlled in their course of theology." *

I need scarcely, Rev. Brethren, point out to you how utterly untrue this statement is, and how totally contradictory to the habitual teaching of the Church. I shall have, before concluding this subject, to quote the teaching of recent Popes on this very question of the relations between faith and science. We shall now see how the Rambler itself accords faith with reason. The writer sets out with the following propositions :—

"The preliminary requisites to faith are that *in their substance*, its articles should not contradict, but should agree with, the fundamental principles and innate laws of our understanding; and that *their signs or evidences* should be found true when tested by observation and reason." †

These principles are resumed and expounded in the essay. And I will here observe, as we shall afterwards see, that the Rambler limits the *substance of faith* to the invisible object of faith, its "inward core;" whilst the *signs of faith* he extends to not merely the evidences, but to all the outward and visible phenomena, that is, to whatever in any object of faith could be perceived by the senses of the witnesses, all which he excludes from the sphere of faith. I must next remark that the office assigned to reason is, not merely to investigate the *evidences*, and to note the *signs*, but it is likewise maintained, as "a preliminary requisite to faith" that reason should test its inward *substance* by its accord or disaccord with the fundamental principles and innate laws of

* No. of July 1861, pp. 166-69.

† p. 170.

the understanding. Reason is to test faith by comparing the principles of the understanding with the substance of faith, on the logical principle of contradiction. He does not say that the substance of faith is capable of demonstration, he affirms the contrary, but he maintains that it must be ascertained not to contradict the innate principles and laws of the mind, and that before belief.

He says we are bound to believe the Prophet's "testimony concerning invisible things, even though their truth is not otherwise brought home to our understanding;" and that the proof that God has spoken, ought, in ordinary circumstances, to furnish the transition from the office of reason to the office of faith. But the Rambler adds:—

"Still the understanding is not merely passive in receiving the articles of faith. As the reason has its innate laws in the spheres of space and time, to which phenomena must conform themselves, or be pronounced impossible, so the understanding has its own innate laws in the spheres of power, knowledge and will, any contradictions to which ought to be fatal to the pretensions of so called truths in the spiritual order." *

After this explanation, it is impossible to understand this second "preliminary requisite to faith," after proof that God has spoken, in any but one sense. It leaves to man the office before believing, even though he has certain proof that God has spoken, of testing the intrinsic substance of the articles proposed by means of the innate principles of his understanding, and thus gives him the power to say whether he thinks them absurd or not, worthy or not of his credence.

The writer then prepares the way for his analysis of faith by contrasting reason and faith through their definitions.

"Reason," he says, "is taken to mean either (1) the mind or the understanding, which distinguishes man from the beast; or (2) the intellectual principles and logical laws, which are the foundation and method of reasoning; or (3) the love of scientific pursuits, the curiosity and interest which make a man a philosopher; or (4) science itself. So *faith* means either (1) a peculiar faculty; or (2) the law of belief on testimony; or (3) a habit of mind prone to absorb itself in religion, and apt to believe in the supernatural; or (4) the *credenda*, or the dogmas believed." †

The writer then proceeds to argue that "in none of these senses is there any essential opposition between reason and faith." But I must here observe that, though it is the

* p. 170.

+ p. 171.

express object of the essay to treat of the *Catholic faith*, yet no approved definition of Catholic faith is given throughout the essay. He observes that "*faith and reason are used by disputants in a very loose way,*" but it is precisely that loose and defective way which he follows. In no one of his definitions does he include the authority of God, which is the formal motive of faith, and the most indispensable element in its Catholic definition. Still less is there any inclusion of the Church, as the medium through which faith is brought into the soul.

"Between reason, in the sense of mind or rational faculty, and faith, or believing faculty, there can," says the Rambler, "be no opposition. Because faith is no such faculty, and therefore cannot be contrasted with the faculty of reason. Faith is *no independent power. It can only be a function of the reason, for the reason is our only faculty capable of believing.* To believe is to know after a certain sort. But all that can be known is known by the reason; there is no other faculty of knowledge in the human soul, nor can we form any idea of such a power. Therefore *whatever we know in any sort, certainly or uncertainly, by faith, science, or opinion, we know by the reason, or not at all.*"*

I put certain passages in Italics to fix attention and save repetition. In thus identifying faith with reason, as one and the same mental power, the writer, be it understood, is not speaking of the whole mind, as being equally the recipient of faith and the possessor of reason, but he contemplates reason as the special faculty of ratiocination, as the power of reasoning. He invariably uses the word *understanding* to express what we should call the intuitive perceptions, and what he calls "the fundamental assumptions" or "prejudices of reason;" whilst by the word *reason* he expresses the particular faculty, or logical power, of demonstration. This he afterwards very clearly explains. So that faith is here identified with the faculty of reasoning. He afterwards calls it, "one of reason's modes of working." It would naturally be supposed that, now at least, the Rambler speaks of human faith, but what follows, forbids this supposition. The writer immediately adds:—

"Hence to oppose faith to reason as a rival faculty is only possible to a fanaticism, like early Lutheranism, which asserted faith to be a new faculty supernaturally added to the mind, a new member of the understanding, *unlike any of its natural faculties, and therefore incomprehensible to the actual man, but a superadded gift, standing*

*in the same relation to the spiritual world as the reason to the natural world. This fanatical opinion has caused many of our difficulties; for philosophers hearing Christians boast of a new faculty above reason and incomprehensible to all who had it not, came to consider it as a mystical transcendental dreamland, the asylum of all the innocent illusions and dangerous impostures which lie beyond the sphere of reason.”**

Faith is of course no new lobe added to the brain as the instrument of mind, such as phrenologists might search after, nor is it an additional faculty of the mind itself, in the sense of being a new subjective power added on to the natural soul. It requires but few words to express that. And yet Christian faith is a power and a virtue added to the soul, which is not identical, far from it, with the natural function of reason. But so to identify faith with reason, and to make out that reason cannot stand in the opposition to faith, as he immediately does, “because faith is *only* a function of reason, one of its modes of working,” is most certainly the purest rationalism, even in terms.

And to say further that it is Lutheran “fanaticism,” or “fanatical opinion” which has caused most of our difficulties, and that it consists in denying that faith is “a superadded gift, standing in the same relation to the spiritual world as the reason to the natural world,” and “therefore incomprehensible to the natural man,” is to deny the inward gift and grace of faith, which is the error of the Pelagians.

To make his meaning yet more clear, our expositor of faith applies to his subject the following axiom drawn from mathematics:—

“Before reason and faith can be usefully contrasted, they must be reduced to the same denominations; there is no profit in comparing things that have no common definition.”†

Thus faith and reason are treated like the quantities of number, time, and space, capable of being reduced by an algebraic process to common denominators. It is thus the Rambler takes the measure of the heavenly gift of faith which was bought with the blood of Christ, and which like every good and perfect gift, descends from the Father of lights. Proceeding to apply this axiom, he next contrasts, according to his second definition, “*faith* as the intellectual principle of belief and reliance on testimony” with *reason* “as comprising the principles and laws of reasoning.” And he asserts that:—

* p. 171.

† p. 172.

“Faith is here only a species of reason, and so incapable of being contrasted with it; we may contrast cow and horse, but not cow and animal. *Faith, as now defined, is only a subordinate species of reason*; and who can deny that the principle of reliance upon testimony is one of the first laws of reason, whether practical or speculative?”

Faith, then, by this process, becomes not merely a species of reason, but “a subordinate species of reason.” And lest we should again be tempted to imagine that he is speaking of human faith, he hastens to dispel the pleasing illusion. He says:—

“This is the fundamental idea of faith; it is a wide genus of mental operations, and of this genus religious faith is one species. To treat this species as if it were a new, abnormal and unnatural state of mind, is to open the gate to a prolific brood of errors.”*

Here can there be no mistake. It is religious faith, as a species of the genus, and a species of a wide genus of mental operations, concerning which to say that there is in it anything new, or not normal, or not natural to the natural state of the mind, is to open the gate to a prolific brood of errors. After this display of Pelagianism, after this formal exposition of rationalism, I naturally searched his essay for the author’s notion of grace, and I found, as will be afterwards seen, that he has drawn no distinction between grace and the providential concurrence of God with His creation.

Whilst the Rambler teaches his readers that religious faith is but a subordinate species of the common genus faith; it may be well for us to consider how the Church teaches us to treat the same subject. In that model book in which the clergy themselves are instructed how to indoctrinate the faithful—in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, we read as follows:—

“Faith is that, in virtue of which we are enabled to hold for firm and certain, whatever the authority of our most holy mother the Church confirms to us as received from God. For no doubt can befall the faithful in those things for which God, who is the very truth, is the authority. From which we understand, how wide is the difference between the faith which we have towards God, and that which we apply to historical writers.”†

Whilst the Rambler subordinates divine to human faith, upholding their essential identity of principle, the Church is solicitous to teach the faithful how far and wide is the differ-

* P. 172.

† Catechis. Rom. Pref.

ence between them. Human faith rests on the word of man, divine faith on the word of God. The medium of human faith is the authority of fallible witnesses, that of divine faith is the authority of the infallible Church. The motive to human belief is the credibility of witnesses liable to be deceived and to deceive; the authority of divine faith is God Himself. Human faith is conceived in the obscurer light of nature's judgment, whilst divine faith is conceived in the light and strength of supernatural grace. It is fitting, my brethren, that we should refresh ourselves with the pure doctrine on Catholic faith, before we proceed in this barren and desolate disquisition.

In his third division, the Rambler contrasts *reason* with *faith*, taking *faith* in the sense of "*a habit of mind prone to absorb itself in religion, and apt to believe in the supernatural,*" and *reason* in the sense of "*the cultus of science—the love of nature, and the curiosity to find out the reason of things.*" And here remark, if you think it well, on the difference of temper in which these two habits are defined. Faith is that *proneness of mind*, and is *apt to believe*, whilst reason, or the *habit of philosophy*, is a *cultus*,—a species of worship, and a *love*. And now we come to the Rambler's analysis of faith. He says:—

"Faith, in general, is belief on testimony: Christian faith is belief in virtue of the Christian testimony. In it we seem to distinguish three elements."

Let it here be carefully noted, that the writer is not professing to treat in what follows of the preliminaries to faith, but of the three elements "*in faith*" and "*of faith.*" He explains what he considers to be the "*basis,*" or, "*first element of faith;*" the "*second element of faith,*" and the "*third element of faith,*" and he gives an analysis of each of them as follows:—

"The basis is the prejudice, presumption, or suspicion that God exists, that He is no Epicurean Deity, but one who personally interferes to reward and punish the good or the evil. This suspicion of the mind branches into an anxiety that questions, and a good-will that is ready to receive any testimony that may answer the question which the pure reason cannot solve, Who is this God? And this anxiety and good-will are the foundation, the first element of faith."*

* p. 179.

Such is the Rambler's first element of faith—a condition of mental doubt and anxiety as to the personal existence and providence of God. And—

“Next,” he says, “comes a purely rational act—the discussion of the credentials of the witnesses who bring us the testimony. This is the true office of reason; by itself it is incapable of solving the question about the nature and personality of God. An Apostle is as unable to discover the answer as any other man; it would therefore be foolish to believe the Apostle's testimony about it, unless he could bring proofs of having received a special communication from the being whom the understanding presages and divines, but whom the reason cannot find, or feel, or see, or describe. These proofs are the special signs of revelation, and it is in discussing these that reason has its rights and prerogatives, even in the presence of an alleged communication from God. And this is the second, or rational element of faith.” *

The Rambler's second element of faith then, is “a purely rational act.” Reason “presages and divines” the Being whom it cannot “find or feel,” and so discusses the credentials of his messenger.

“The third element,” he says, “is the submission of the understanding to the message after the reason has countersigned the credentials. The intellect, in submitting, admits the new doctrine into its code of laws as a new principle of thought and action, a touchstone of philosophy, a rule to distinguish good and evil, a principle of development and life, a mould for its opinions, habits and conduct. Though after this the substance of the mind remains only what it was before, yet the new horizon which is opened to it appears to it like a new creation and a new life.” †

This then is, according to the Rambler, the analysis of faith. It consists of three elements. The *first* is “a suspicion branching into an anxiety that questions,” or, as it is afterwards put—“The first element of faith is a presumption of reason, and a moral venturesomeness in risking something for the inner aspirations of the soul.” ‡ The *second* is “a purely rational act discussing the credentials of the witnesses.” But it is asserted that the proof sought is of “a special communication from a being whom the understanding presages and divines, but whom the reason cannot find or feel, or see, or describe.” The *third* and last element of faith is “submission of the understanding to the message, after reason has signed the credentials.” And so it is concluded that faith cannot be opposed to reason. Were this a correct exposition of it, faith certainly would be “only a function

* Ibid.

† p. 173.

‡ p. 177.

of reason, one of its modes of working." The three elements give us its major, minor, and conclusion. But the major is that presumption of God's existence which the reason cannot find or describe; the minor comprises rational proof of the veracity of His witness; whilst the conclusion can only be drawn after the inward substance of the message has been submitted to a rational test. This is very plainly stated in the following passage:—

"In contrasting reason with the second element of faith,—the discussion of the evidence,—we may pass by, as immaterial, the method by which the mind of the prophet is illuminated, and we need only attend to the *signs* which prove his commission, and to the *matter* of his message so far as it agrees with or contradicts those principles of understanding and conscience which are already established by the light of nature."*

The *mode* of the Prophet's illumination may be passed over because it is *immaterial*, but the *matter* revealed is to be tested before it is believed "by the light of nature," that is, it is to be so tested, before the logical conclusion is drawn that God has spoken, for this is what is here meant by believing. Instead then of resting secure upon the authority of God, the incomprehensible fountain of all truth, the moment there is evidence that He has spoken, the principles of the human mind are to be made the rule by which to measure the consistency of that new truth which He has revealed.

In describing the understanding, as the foundation of reason, that is, of the logical faculty, there is such a heaping of ambiguous words, and such an absence of definite declaration as to whether our understanding has, or has not, a sure perception of truth, that it is difficult at first to say whether the Rambler maintains that the function of reason rests on doubts or on certainties. At last, however, his views come out clearly, and we are landed on the desolate shore of scepticism. Not that I charge the writer with scepticism, but only the principles set forth by him.

We have already had it stated that reason cannot find or describe God. The only question that remains is, whether there be any certain intuition of God in the understanding, or the certain perception of any truth. I must here transcribe a long passage. He says:—

"Now faith has to be compared with reason in each of these three elements, the first of which is the *presumption* of the being of a God. *This feeling* is partly due to the understanding, partly to

the affections, for its object is one towards which our whole nature yearns; and the question is, whether the presumption that there is a God, a rewarder and punisher, and whether *the hopes and fears that secretly prompt* our affirmation of His existence, are rational or irrational. Can reason overthrow them, or do they overthrow reason? The presumption that there is a God arises *from the very structure of the understanding*, to which the conceptions of power, reason and will, are at least as original and fundamental as those of space and time. If we are necessitated to *affirm* space and time, we are equally forced to *affirm* power, knowledge, and will. If we can set no limit to the former, neither can we to the latter. We are as much forced to *suppose* a power transcending all other powers, a reason comprehending without being composed of all other reasons, and a will supreme over all other wills, as we are to *suppose* a space that comprehends all parts of space, and a duration that comprehends all moments of time. These are *fundamental assumptions of the mind*, which are presupposed in every act of thought; *the mind has no demonstration of them*, for they are before all argument, the necessary *prejudices* and *pre-judgments* of reason, and therefore in perfect harmony with reason. Neither can *the presumptions which spring from the misgivings of conscience*, and from *our hopes and fears* be said to be against reason. They do not lie in the same plane with reason, and so there can be no true comparison, and therefore no essential contradiction between them.”*

I do not stop to handle the particular points of metaphysical science detailed in this paragraph, because that is not my object, but I cannot resist pointing out the assertion that “the presumption that there is a God arises from the very structure of our understanding.” Here is no recognition of “the light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world,” and which “shineth in darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it;”† of that light concerning which the Fathers have so exquisitely written, as of the natural illumination of the human intelligence by which God left not Himself without witness in the world, of that light concerning which even the wisest of the pagans philosophised. What I have to point out is, that every expression respecting the fundamental conceptions of the mind, the bases of thought which are before all argument, leaves it doubtful whether they give us any certainty of their truth or not. But we are not finally left in any great ambiguity as to the real sense of the author. He expresses himself with clearness in a passage a few pages further on. He says:—

“The first principles and axioms of the understanding are *not subjects of discussion*. The grounds of any science are *assumed* as

* p. 174.

† St. John c. 1.

unquestionable by that science. He that has once determined to act, must *resolutely put down all doubts that trouble him while acting*, unless he would be like Hamlet, continually resolving to do, yet doing nothing but resolve. But *in most of these cases the certainty is only provisional, not absolute*; whereas faith requires an absolute surrender of the right of doubt, not for a time, but for ever.”*

It is true the assertion that the fundamental principles have only a provisional certainty, is qualified by the clause, “in most cases.” But this belongs to the hesitating style of the writer, who can seldom put a proposition so circumscribed and definite as not to break in upon it at one time or other, with some qualification that impresses the mind with doubt and uncertainty. Suffice it that he leaves the certainty of the fundamental principles of the understanding as in most cases only provisional, and that, as we shall see directly, he classes the existence of God as amongst those cases. How then do we know the existence of God? Not, says the Rambler, by reason, for reason cannot find that Being, or describe Him. The solution of the difficulty is given in the following passage:—

“The second element of faith follows naturally from the first. The *understanding presumes* that an infinite power, wisdom, and will, exist; the *conscience presumes* that there is a Supreme Judge, who will finally reward all merit and demerit; and the *reason, incapable of finding a direct demonstration in the phenomena, is naturally driven to seek an indirect one in testimony*. It presumes that a revelation is possible; and the man who knows that it has not been made to himself, seeks it ‘at second hand,’ from others.”†

The understanding and the conscience presume that God exists and is our Judge, but reason is incapable of finding a direct demonstration of that existence, wherefore we are “driven to seek an indirect one in testimony.” That is to say, we have no proof of God’s existence, according to the Rambler, unless by faith. And yet that faith is affirmed to be “only a function of reason, one of its modes of operation.” What a terrible result of the science on which the writer prides himself, of the science from which men of ecclesiastical pursuits are warned as beyond their sphere and competency. This comes of setting up the logical faculty, the mere instrument of investigation, as the one and only measure and test of all truth.

Now the Church has always upheld the prerogatives of

* p. 179.

† p. 177.

natural reason as well as the prerogatives of faith, and has upheld them on their own distinct and separate grounds. It is of the pagan man before the Gospel that St. Paul says: "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven, against all ungodliness and injustice of those men that detain the truth of God in injustice; because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable. Because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified Him as God, or given thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves to be wise they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God, into the likeness of corruptible man," &c.* The Apostle expressly points out that the fault of those men who had natural truth and not revelation to guide them, was their own, because "they liked not to have God in their knowledge." He assigns to man the natural knowledge of God, not as arising "from the very structure of the mind," but because "God hath manifested it unto them;" and they are inexcusable because "not liking to have God in their knowledge," they have "detained the truth of God in injustice."

The Catechism of the Council of Trent teaches:—"Yet as the apostle says, *God has not left Himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with good and gladness.* Which was the reason why the philosophers did not think meanly of God, not attributing by any means any thing corporeal, any thing gross or mingled to Him; to whom also they ascribed the perfect strength and fulness of all good; so that from Him, as from an eternal never-failing fountain of goodness and bounty, flows all that good which all created beings, and perfect natures enjoy; whom they called *wise, author of truth, loving, just, bountiful*, and by other names, signifying the supreme and absolute perfection."†

When, with others, the Abbè Bautain had maintained certain propositions in which too much was ascribed to the province of faith and too little to that of reason, his Bishop admonished him, and published a pastoral on the subject. On this Pope Gregory XVI., by a Brief in 1834, both commended the Bishop and expressed his hope that the Abbé and his companions would retract their errors. This they did

* Rom. c. 1.

† Catechis. Rom. c. 2, sec. 6.

by signing six propositions, of which the second and fifth are as follows:—

“2°. Reason avails to prove the existence of God with certainty. As the heavenly gift of faith is posterior to revelation, it cannot be advantageously alleged against the atheist.”

“5°. The use of reason precedes faith and brings man to it by the help of revelation and grace.”*

But as the doctrine of Traditionalism still continued to be maintained by various writers, by a decree of the Congregation of the Index of 1855, the Abbé Bonnetty and others were required to sign the following propositions:—

“1°. Though faith be above reason, yet no real conflict or opposition can ever be found between them, for both are derived from one and the same immutable fountain of truth—the Almighty and all good God, and so they bring mutual aid to each other.”

“2°. Reason can prove the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the liberty of man, with certainty. Faith is posterior to reason, and therefore it cannot be advantageously alleged to prove the existence of God against the atheist, or to prove the spirituality and the liberty of the rational soul against the follower of naturalism or fatalism.”

“3°. The use of reason precedes faith, and brings man to it by the help of revelation and grace.”†

The Rambler does not complete its most unorthodox analysis of faith, as I previously observed, without giving some account of the subject of grace. I here give the passage in its integrity.—

“The soul which believes that it has received the truth from God, can scarcely help proceeding a step further, to the belief that it receives other help besides the new light. The Almighty and All-good has more to give than a dry proposition, a definition, an axiom. If we communicate at all with Him, the communication cannot end with pure dogma. The soul *here catches a glimpse of the system of grace*, which it finds *impossible to confine to the supernatural functions of religion*; besides attributing its faith and its charity to God, the soul sees that what it before reckoned to be only natural acts were all performed with his concurrence. Of ourselves, we are non-existent; the same creative hand and force which is needed to call us into being, is needed every moment to sustain us in being. Our existence is a perpetual creation; *every pulse of life requires*

* Denziger's Enchiridion, No. 1488.

† See on the subject of these propositions the Letter of the professors of the University of Louvain of April 1860, addressed to the Card. Prefect of the Cong. of the Index, together with the Card. Prefect's reply. In the *Revue Théologique* 5me. Serie, tome 1. 1860.

the free concurrence, *the grace*, of the Creator. To the eye of faith, then, all nature is transfigured, and becomes in one sense only the continuation and complement of the *creative and supernatural* Providence of God.”*

I shall offer two remarks on this exposition of grace. In the first place, the language of it seems to convey the idea that the knowledge of grace comes after faith. The belief that the soul receives other help is described as being “a step further,” after receiving truth from God. The communication “cannot end in dogma, the soul here catches a glimpse of the system of grace.” The writer is silent as to whether grace precedes faith, but seems to intimate that the perception of grace comes as a step after receiving the truth of revelation. Reasoning against the Semipelagians, St. Prosper beautifully says :—“We must confess the grace of God in all its reality and integrity, for it is the first office of grace to make us sensible of the help it is giving us.” †

My second remark is more serious. The writer appears to have again applied his mathematical formulary, and has reduced the grace of Christ and the providential concurrence of God with his creation to one common denomination. He says, it is impossible to confine grace to the supernatural functions of religion. Every pulse of life requires the free concurrence, the grace, of the Creator; all nature is transfigured to the eye of faith, and becomes in one sense only the continuation and complement of the creative and supernatural Providence of God. Yet the Rambler is here explaining “the system of grace,” and of that grace which comes to our knowledge through faith. But grace with him, though designated as supernatural, is not the grace of Redemption, but the power by which all created nature is continued and upheld in existence. Nor is there given the slightest glimpse, by any single expression, of another and more heavenly order of grace. The heathens had a perception of God’s providential concurrence, the Philosophers proclaimed it as well as the prayers of the multitude.

The first of the two articles on Reason and Faith the Rambler concludes with a discussion on the subject of doubts respecting belief, and gives a course of direction on their mode of treatment. He observes that Christian doctors teach us that “we have renounced all our rights of doubting about doctrines received,” that those doctors tell us “faith dies by doubt,”

* P. 173.

† S. Prosper. ep. ad Virg. Demetriad.

yet he himself boldly discusses the question whether faith does forbid doubt, and whether it be sinful for one who has "once submitted to the dogmas," to subject his doubts to his reason. After such a theory of faith as we have been considering, the conclusion will naturally be anticipated. I will not delay you, my Rev. Brethren, on the argument, the conclusions are contained in the following directions.

"Weak, irrational and scrupulous doubts are not to be treated *as rational* but should be exercised in the roughest and readiest way, by an act of will, or by attending to other things."*

"When doubts are attended by opposite characteristics; when the mind is *unable to answer objections, to see its way through the labyrinth of argument, and to find the foundation of faith*,—then it appears that *human reason requires* a different treatment. For if such doubts are shirked, instead of their being expelled, the throne of reason is abdicated to them,.....The rational doubt must be overcome rationally, not by inattention, carelessness, dissipation, or business, *but by reasons*. This presumably is the meaning of the precepts, '*prove all things*' and '*be ready to give a reason for your hope*.'"[†]

Not a word is uttered in this new course of spiritual direction as to the help of prayer, as to the grace to be drawn from the sacraments, or as to the aid to be sought of the spiritual guide, but rational doubt of the faith received is to be met by reason. And by way of encouragement to persevere in this course of treatment, "man having but a short time, and full of misery" is exhorted in this strain:—

"Patience of difficulties is one of the first principles of reason, and is quite distinct from the attempts to surpass difficulties by refusing to see them. *Keep your eyes open to them*, but at the same time remember that the course of mental enlightenment is extremely slow; its progress is counted by ages; its single steps require years and decades. It is idle to forestall the solution of a problem which cannot be determined for the next century."[‡]

And this direction refers to doubts respecting "faith, after a man has once received dogmas, with or without previous examination."[§]

Advice is given with a special view to apparent antagonisms between faith and scientific discovery, and we are told that:—

"Christians have been always overcome, but always because they

* p. 180.

† p. 181.

‡ p. 181.

§ p. 180.

have fought for more than the Christian dogma; because *at any given moment* they have failed to recognize that *all except the central core of revealed truth is human addition*, and therefore fallible, changeable, and obnoxious to decay.”*

Are we, my Rev. Brethren, listening to a Catholic or to some one from the extreme sects of Protestantism? One more of these spiritual rules of direction and I have done with them.

“Hence follows a practical rule: that faith, once received, as an operative principle of the heart, does not cease to be binding whenever an unsolved doubt or difficulty is suspended in the intellect. The mind must work at the solution with patience and circumspection, and without prejudice to Christian practice.”†

Reason is to work at solving the scepticism of the mind, whilst faith is to live on as an “operative principle of the heart.” To which doctrine the Catholic child will answer from his catechism, and from his heart:—Faith is to believe, without doubting, whatever God reveals. Ask that child—Why he must believe whatever God has revealed?—He will answer—Because God is the very truth, and cannot deceive or be deceived. And if you then ask him—How he is to know what the things are which God has revealed?—He will reply—By the testimony and authority of the Catholic Church, which Christ has appointed to teach all nations. And by these simple, these sublime words, the expression of that inward light and grace, and of that Creed which he received in baptism, he is armed for life against the principles which the Rambler here addresses to him.

Coming to the second article, in which the Rambler continues the subject, I shall limit my attention to a single point, though others are equally deserving of animadversion. Contrasting Reason with Faith as concerns their respective objects, the accumulations of science with the articles of belief, the writer lays down the position that there can be no question of a contest between them, because “natural science and the dogmas of faith stand on different platforms, and have nothing to do with each other,”‡ and yet two pages further we are told that—“The relations of Church and Scripture with science involve the very existence of science.” After excluding the proof of God’s existence from science, and maintaining that faith is a function of reason, and one of its modes of operation, one is perplexed to reconcile all this together. But the writer has a clear

* p. 182.

† p. 183.

‡ Rambler of September 1861, p. 326.

aim in view. That object is, to exclude everything out of the domain of faith which is, or ever has been, visible or apprehensible by the sense of man. His position is thus expressed:—

“A detailed review of the contents of the creeds and definitions would show that their subject matter is *all* outside the sphere of phenomena, which is the realm of science.”*

Again,—

“The creed binds us to accept Scripture, with all its statements, about nature and man, *such as science has a right to dispute about*.... But, for example, cannot Church and Fathers be cited in support of a cosmogony which, *however well grounded in Scripture and tradition, is quite disproved by modern discoveries*? Are we bound to such a theory? And has not the Church condemned as false and unscriptural the theory of the mechanism of the universe, which is now a demonstrated truth? *Are we bound by such a condemnation*? Here is the focus of the difficulty.”†

The Rambler solves the difficulty by limiting the object of faith to the invisible substance comprised in the dogma, to which neither sense nor science can have any access. “The subject matter of the articles and definitions is all outside the sphere of phenomena, which is the realm of science.”

Again,—

“The Catholic faith is the body of doctrine proposed to all the faithful as necessary to be believed in order to salvation. It consists of articles of faith, laws of morals, and certain dogmatic facts in which some of the doctrines are enveloped. The revealed dogmas are outside the sphere of science, and afford no ground of collision between science and faith. The dogmatic facts are either miraculous, and so beyond the sphere of science, as the article, ‘born of the Virgin Mary;’ or such individual events as the commonest testimony is sufficient to prove, as the article, ‘crucified and buried.’ But it is to be noticed that *these external facts are not in themselves the objects of faith*, but only in so far as they are the outward expressions of an inward truth.”‡

And again it is said:—

“The Catholic faith then being limited to the invisible substance, and the few individual facts in which *this substance* is manifested, it is clear that the authority of the Teacher of faith is by the force of the term *comprised within the same limits*.”§

Be it then observed that here the external facts, the writer also calls them dogmatic facts, such to take his own examples, as,

* P. 327.

† P. 329.

‡ P. 329.

§ P. 329.

the birth of Christ from the Virgin Mary, His passion, death, and burial, are the *envelope* in which the substance of faith is manifested, the *phenomena* with which science deals, but not faith. And the articles and definitions of faith are pronounced to be "outside the sphere of phenomena;" whilst of these very articles, "Born of the Virgin Mary, was crucified, dead and buried," the writer says, "It is to be noted that these external facts are *not in themselves objects of faith*, but only so far as they are the expressions of an inward truth." It is impossible to understand the doctrine otherwise than as the excluding of whatever is capable of perception by sense from the realm of faith. And thus, not the visible and palpable body of our Lord as born of the Virgin Mary, not His visible agony, not the visible blood as it was shed before the eyes of Mary and John, not that same visible and palpable body as it lay dead and was seen and touched by those who laid it in the winding sheet, not that body as handled by St. Thomas, after it had arisen from the dead, not the visible ascension of our Lord to heaven, as seen by the disciples—not these, no, these are not the things of faith; these are the phenomena which envelope "the invisible substance of truth,"—"the inward core," which, according to the Rambler, "is alone of faith."

What then becomes of the flesh and blood of our Lord, and of all the articles concerning it, from the article, "Born of the Virgin Mary," to the article, "He ascended into heaven?" And what becomes of the doctrine of the visible Church? If all that is of a visible nature be swept out of the sphere of belief; if the Catholic faith be "limited to the invisible substance;" if it can be said of "the articles and definitions of faith," that "their subject matter is *all* outside the sphere of phenomena, which is the realm of science," and if that other position be true, as the Rambler incessantly inculcates, and the Home and Foreign Review reiterates, that the "intellectual office remains perfectly distinct from the spiritual office," how is the Church, the spiritual teacher of men, to bridge the way between the inward truth and the corporal visible and human elements, those realities of our Lord's body, and of that other visible body the Church? And how are we to believe of certain elements which we see and handle, whilst we sanctify them, that they are constituents of the sacraments? It is true they are the signs and channels of invisible grace, but it is a part of our faith in the sacraments that those visible elements are the channels of grace, and that Christ has made them such. We believe as much in the signs as in what is signified by them. Let a Catholic imagine, if he can,

that our faith is limited to the spiritual substance of Christ, of the sacraments and of the Church, and extends to nothing besides.

The question will naturally be asked—What Catholic proof does the expounder of such a system adduce in support of his views? I am ashamed for the author whilst I reply. He has brought forth a single passage from a most illustrious divine, utterly perverting its sense, and making so orthodox a theologian as Suarez, responsible for one of the most unorthodox theories that was ever put forth. Here is the passage as quoted in the Rambler :—

“Of the phenomenon,” says Suarez, “there is not faith but experience; it is not revealed, but seen; it is not proposed as the object of faith, but to lead to faith. The inner truth and substance is something distinct from the outward seeming, and faith has to do with the substance, not with the shape.”—*De Fid. disp. 2. § 9.*

The writer then adds as his own illustration of the above doctrine,—

“St. Thomas puts his finger into his Master’s side, and makes his act of faith, not in what he sees, but in what he infers. He saw the living flesh that had been dead; he believed in the incarnate God.”*

From these words it is plain the Rambler would have us understand, that “the living flesh of Christ” was not an object of faith, not even that living flesh arisen from dead. Yet it is this very example of St. Thomas which Suarez is explaining. And the Rambler, in giving his own comment, gives the objection of Suarez, not his answer. The great theologian has been discussing the question—Can faith and scientific knowledge of the same truth dwell together in one and the same mind? He concludes, with the great body of divines, that they can. For instance, a Christian philosopher knows the existence of God both by reason and faith, and the two motives act in combination in his mind. Closing this disquisition, he opens a correlative one.—Can the corporeal perception of an object coexist with faith in the same object? Again he concludes it can. And these are his words :—

“Some persons simply deny this, and, in consequence, they say that when Christ said to Thomas—‘*Because thou hast seen me, Thomas, thou hast believed.*’—St. Thomas believed not in Christ’s Resurrection because he had seen Him alive and had touched the living body with his hands; and so they refer the faith of Thomas

to his belief in Christ's Divinity. Tolentanus, on Chap. 20th of St. John, says what is not far from this view. 'But I,' continues Suarez, 'believe without any hesitation, that both Thomas and all the Apostles, had supernatural faith in the Resurrection of Christ, and in the truth of His body and of His life. This St. Thomas has maintained in no obscure way in his *Sum.* p. 3, quest. 55, art. 5-6. And in my commentary I have maintained and proved yet more clearly, that the Apostles believed that Christ had truly risen with far greater certainty than they could have gained from the sole testimony of their senses. Who indeed will deny that they had an infused faith of the mysteries concerning the humanity of Christ?'

Then comes the passage translated in the Rambler:—

"I say, therefore, that in an object perceptible by corporal sense, there are two things to be distinguished: the *species* visibly seen is one thing, and of this certainly there is not faith but experience, for no revelation is made of that mere outward appearance, nor is that proposed to our belief, but that it may lead to belief. But another thing is the *truth and substance of that which is seen*, and faith in that may coexist with sight. And so through faith did Thomas believe that it was Christ Himself, and very man, that he saw, and touched, and heard speaking."*

Suarez speaks of the *species* or visible appearance as opposed to the reality of Christ's body. Thomas believed not on the report of the Apostles, it might have been a vision, or it might have been some other person, as Peter knew not it was an angel, but thought he saw a vision. And so Thomas wished to put his hands into the wounds to be certain of the fact that it was He who had been crucified. The point in question was, not "the Incarnate God," but whether the Incarnate God had again appeared on earth *in living flesh*. And our Lord clearly points to that which Thomas had seen, as having become the object of his belief.—"Because thou hast *seen*, Thomas, thou hast believed. Blessed are they who have not seen, and have believed."

We, at all events, have not seen what the Apostles did see and believed, and through their infallible testimony, which implies more than sight and touch, we are commanded to believe what they saw. St. John says:—"That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have

* "Dico ergo in objecto sensibilibus visis duo esse distinguenda: unum est species illa, quæ extrinsecus apparet, et de hac certe non est fides, sed experientia, quia de sola illa externa apparentia non fit revelatio, neque illa proponitur, ut credatur, sed ut ducat ad fidem. Aliud autem est veritas et substantia ejus rei, quæ videtur, et de hac potest esse simul cum visione externa, et ita per fidem credidit Thomas esse ipsummet Christum, ac verum hominem, quem videbat, et tangebatur, et loquentem audiebat."—Suarez, De Fid. disp. 3, sec. 9. n. 24.

seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life...we declare unto you, that you may have fellowship with us." The disciple of love thus combines together the evidences of hearing, eyesight, corporal touch, and inspiration, as joint evidences of one and the same truth.

It is by such handling of a text of Scripture, and of a passage from a great Divine, that the Rambler sweeps half the articles out of the Creed, and leaves for our faith but "the central core of revealed truth." How then does that Journal get over the difficulty respecting those very things defined and taught by the Church which are not of the central core, or invisible substance of truth? He represents the Church as exercising two distinct authorities, the one infallible and the other fallible. She is infallible as the teacher of faith, and fallible as the nurse of faith. I cannot repeat all the vile things uttered by the Rambler on what he supposes the Church to do in this last capacity, but I will give a few passages. That journal says, then :—

"The government of the Church may be considered in several aspects; in one it is the organ of the Holy Spirit, guarding the deposit of faith, teaching faith and morals with infallible precision, and claiming interior assent to its decisions. In another aspect the government of the Church is *the organ of the multitude of Christians, reflecting faithfully their prejudices and fears*, and repressing what they for the moment feel to be dangerous to their convictions and principles....In this aspect the Church nurses her children, as a mother presides in the nursery, lowering her intellect to the level of her babes, *at the risk of gaining the contempt of her children who have outgrown the need of such condescension. When she feels too weak to receive new truths, she will prohibit them*, at the risk of scandalising the few philosophers who may yet know them."*

Speaking of students of theology "forced to suck in the theories which ages of ignorance have foisted on Moses," and of "the contempt of intelligent infidels, who, after hearing divines teaching physical falsehoods as Bible truths, have mocked at the same men when they claimed credence for biblical faith and morals;" the Rambler continues :—

"Most people have at least biblical knowledge enough to be aware that those who are found unfaithful in what men can see, are not to be believed when they speak of heavenly things that men cannot see."†

As if men had seen God creating the world. Concerning

* p. 337.

† p. 338.

which creation it is, that St. Thomas especially maintains, in a passage partly cited in this essay of the Rambler, that it is of faith, not of demonstration, because it is not of the necessary, but of the contingent will of God, to which man has only access through God's revelation.* But the Rambler continues his remarks in this style :—

“Again, as this is not a matter in which the infallible teaching Church comes into action, but only *the Church in her human and social character*, it is not disrespectful to remember, that *there is greatest danger of the human weaknesses of the leaders of the Church cropping out, and overshadowing the divine character of the institution which they administer.* There is danger in all cases of interference with secular science or progress, on the ground of its supposed ill effects upon faith, *lest the interfering authorities should mistake their own irritation for a scandal growing up in the minds of the masses.*”†

Again we have the following question :—

“Is it not scandalous to allow Congregations like those of the Index and Holy Office to come forth with all its pomp of authority, and to condemn as false and heretical theories which the Church, as teacher of truth, has never so condemned?—as if the only object were to impose upon weak minds, and to force them to obedience by pretending an infallible authority which really has nothing to do with the matter in hand.”

To this question we have the following answer :—

“We need not be very careful to answer this objection; the Church as nurse of faith is only a generalization of the social action of the Christian community; *unquestionably, the whole Christian community may sometimes act in a scandalous manner, and compel its organ to do unjustifiable things.*”‡

I will now resume the system taught by this new school.—The ethical and scientific offices remain permanently apart from the spiritual office. The certainty of the fundamental principles and axioms of the understanding, those assumptions before all reasoning, are in most cases only provisional, not absolute. Reason, incapable of finding a direct demonstration of God in the world of phenomena, is driven to seek one at second hand in revelation. Faith is a function of reason, one of its modes of operation. One of the antecedents before faith is to test the revelation, whether it accords with

* St. Thomas Sum, p. 1, quest. 46, art. 1.

† p. 339.

‡ p. 343.

the innate principles and laws of the mind. Faith embraces the inward, invisible substance of truth, but not the outward and visible phenomena in which truth is manifested. The phenomena belong to the sphere of science, not of faith. The Church is an infallible authority on faith, but fallible as the nurse of faith. As nurse of faith, the Church is only a generalization of the social action of the Christian community, and the whole Christian community may act in a scandalous manner, compelling its organ, that is its authorities, to do unjustifiable things. The Christian is to meet rational doubts against his faith by reasoning.

These are the fundamental principles of a system, which has evidently been put together with a great deal of deliberation. It is constructed upon the latent ground, that the logical faculty in man is his criterion of all certainty both human and divine, the test by which all truth is to be tried.

Let us now listen to the Catechism of the Council of Trent :—

“He who has this heavenly knowledge of faith, is free from this spirit of curious investigation. For when God commanded us to believe, He did not prescribe to us the searching of His divine judgments, or the inquiring into their reason and cause; but He commanded unchanging faith, which makes the mind to rest in the knowledge of His eternal truth. And truly, since the apostle witnesses that *God is true, but every man a liar*, since only the arrogant and impudent man will refuse credit to a grave and wise person, when he affirms anything for truth, but presses him further to prove his statement by reason and witnesses. What rashness and what folly must it be, for one who hears the word of God himself, to demand reasons for the heavenly doctrine of salvation? Faith therefore must be held free, not only from all doubtfulness, but from all desire of demonstration.”*

And the words of Pope Gregory XVI., in his Brief in 1835, condemning the works of Hermes, are not alien from the subject in hand :—

“Among these masters of error is George Hermes, who, turning aside from the royal path which universal tradition and the Holy Fathers have constructed for expounding and vindicating the truths of faith, nay proudly despising and condemning that path, has planned a darksome way to every kind of error by means of positive doubt, as if that were the basis of all theological investigation, and in the principle he has set down that reason is the supreme rule and the one means for gaining the knowledge of supernatural truth.”

* Catechis. Rom. c. 2, sec. 3.

I wish to limit my remarks to what has been published by the Periodical on which I am adverting during the last two years, or I might have more especially drawn your attention to two articles in the shape of letters, published in the *Ramblers* of July 1855, and of May 1856, in which the heretical proposition is set forth and defended, that "*original sin comes not by propagation.*" A proposition condemned against the Pelagians by the Synod of Milevis, confirmed by Innocent I., by the great Synod of Carthage in 418, and by Pope Zozimus in a Letter promulgated throughout the Christian Church. It was again condemned against the Semi-pelagians in the famous Council of Orange, confirmed by Boniface II., and once more by the Council of Trent. The Council of Trent expressly declares that original sin "comes by propagation." And, resuming the language of the Synods before referred to, the Council pronounces anathema on any one who says that "children who are baptised for the remission of sins derive nothing of original sin from Adam, which is necessary to be expiated in the laver of regeneration for the gaining of eternal life; the consequence of which would be, that in their case the form of baptism for the remission of sins would have not a true but a false signification."* And all these Councils declare unanimously that in this sense are to be understood the words of St. Paul: "*By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned.*"

But the writer in the *Rambler* asserts that "we inherit original sin because we inherit nature, and only nature, by natural propagation;"† that "original sin is essentially and formally the loss of original justice; that it is a withdrawal of the supernatural 'original justice,' and a consequent abandonment of man to the course of nature;"‡ that "this degradation constitutes the *guilt* of original sin; and it is only in this sense that guilt can be inherited;"§ that "original sin is simply the withholding of a supernatural gift; which withholding is an act of God, depending on the free will of God, not on any natural law;"|| and the writer asks—"If sin is propagated, why do we inherit Adam's sin, and not Noe's, or that of our immediate parents?"¶ And he says that original sin "is caused by the merciful decree of the all-merciful God, who places us on a

* Con. Trid. Sess. 5 Decret. de peccato orig.

† *Rambler*, July 1855, p. 27.

‡ P. 26.

§ P. 27.

|| P. 29.

¶ *Rambler* of May 1856, p. 340.

level, because we should infallibly break our necks on the heights.”*

Yet whilst the Rambler makes God the author of original sin, and makes that sin to consist in a descent from a supernatural state to a state of nature, or as he calls it, of “mere nature;” the Council of Orange defines against the Pelagians that—“If any one asserts that the prevarication of Adam was noxious to him alone, and not to all that spring from him, or testifies that corporal death only, which is the penalty of sin, and not sin, which is the death of the soul, has passed through one man unto the whole human race, he will ascribe injustice to God.”† And the Council of Trent repeats the sense of that early Council in stronger terms, pronouncing anathema on those who assert such a doctrine.

‡ I pass over other grievous errors in the writings here quoted, nor will I stay to notice the levity with which so grave and solemn a subject is treated. Yet can I not pass over the spirit in which the writers of the articles to which I have drawn your attention, habitually abandon the forms of speaking usual with the Church, and adopt new modes of expression on subjects of faith and theology, such as the Church has never recognized. They seem to have never appreciated or understood those solemn admonitions of St. Paul, addressed to two Bishops, his disciples, which the Church is never weary of repeating. To Timothy, the Apostle says:—“*Hold the form of sound words, which thou hast heard of me in faith, and in the love which is in Christ Jesus.*” Whilst to Titus he says:—“*Shew thyself an example of good works, in doctrine, in integrity, in gravity, the sound word that cannot be blamed.*” To those writers the words are but too much applicable which the reigning Pontiff was compelled to use in condemning the works of Gunther.—“Nor,” says Pius IX., “shall we pass over in silence, how the works of Gunther violate the sound form of speaking, as though it were lawful to forget the words of St. Paul, or that most grave admoni-

* Rambler of May, 1856, p. 340.

† Concil. Arausic. II. can. 2.

‡ I think it well to anticipate the remark which may be made, that I myself have contributed to the Rambler, and so given it encouragement. I did so at a period of its existence when partly at my own suggestion, the Editor under whose control certain unorthodox articles had appeared, withdrew, and when the original projector of the Journal had resumed its guidance. It was at that period that I contributed, under my own signature, a series of articles upon an historical and archeological subject, the only contribution I ever gave. But before I had concluded the subject, I had reason to regret having ever appeared there, for, again diverting from that purely literary course which I understood was to be pursued, a series of letters were admitted in which the most injurious and unjustifiable comments were made on the method of moral training pursued in Catholic Colleges, comments evidently written by one to whom the subject was both new and practically but little known.

tion of St. Augustine :—‘ It is the law with us to speak after a certain rule, lest licence in the use of words should generate impious opinions concerning the things expressed by words.’ ”*

In an Article of December 1858 it was formally maintained that St. Augustine, the most illustrious doctor of divine grace against the Pelagians, was the Father of the detestable errors of the Jansenists. Nor when that dissertation had been so ably refuted, did the directors of the Rambler make the least reparation to the honour of the saint, or exert any effort to remove the scandal caused to the faithful.

In an article on Father Campion of May 1861, the loss of England to the faith is directly attributed to Popes Paul III., Paul IV., and St. Pius V.—“ Those Popes lost England to the faith.”†

In an article of July 1861, on the late Count Cavour, the eulogy on whom contrasts strangely to the Catholic mind after the philosophical coldness and indifference with which the Pope is habitually treated—there will be found the following propositions :—

“ Private vengeance in a savage community is the commencement of civil law ; in a civil society it is the inauguration of barbarism. The crime of Mazzini lies not so much in the theory of the dagger, as in the principle by which that theory is applied.”‡

In an Article of March 1861 on the Administration of Charitable Trusts, the uncatholic doctrine of a previous writer is thus reiterated with approbation :—

“ A gift for masses for the soul of the donor himself is not a charity. No man can establish a charity for his own private benefit, because the good of others is of the essence of every such foundation. But a bequest for masses looks only to the good of the testator’s soul. It is not therefore a charity in the legal sense, nor entitled to the perpetuity which the law creates for charity alone.”

The sense of the writer becomes yet more manifest in the following passage :—

“ The law of the Church does not differ from the English law so widely as has been imagined. The Church regarding such gifts as in substance for the support of the priests, does not prohibit them, but it restricts them to the utmost, recognizing them no otherwise than to enforce against the ecclesiastic accepting them, the obligation of discharging the conditions or wishes of the testators.”

It is scarcely requisite to point out the errors expressed

* Brief of Pius IX. 15th June, 1857, to Abp. of Cologne.

† P. 91.

‡ P. 155-6.

or insinuated in these passages, as in others of the like character. But it is inexplicable that a Catholic Journal should not merely put them forth, but should furnish arguments of such a nature in support of a penal administration of law against bequests for the repose of souls; and this at the very moment when the Catholic community feels their grievous pressure, and their bitter injustice, not only against the living who would provide for the future repose of their souls, but even against the silent and defenceless dead. Such was not the old law of England; such at this moment is not the law as administered in Ireland; where even the Charitable Commission holds foundations for Masses for the departed. Yet the Rambler would rivet upon us this penal law against the good of departed souls by furnished principles on which to uphold its continuance. To say, or even insinuate, that a man cannot have charity for his own soul, is to contradict the teaching of our Blessed Lord, who commands us to love our neighbour even as ourselves, thereby giving us the love we should have for ourselves as the standard by which to measure our love of our neighbour. And certainly if, as St. Paul teaches, they who serve the altar live by the altar, on the other hand, it is a most Catholic and pious act to provide that the Sacrifice of the Altar be offered for the repose of our souls after our departure from this world. When then the Rambler asserts that "the good of others is of the essence of every such foundation," meaning others than the founders and excluding them, he contradicts the teaching, the liturgy, the usage and the canons of the Church. And when the writer adds that "The law of the Church does not differ from the English law so widely as has been imagined, that the Church regards such gifts as in substance for the support of priests," that "she does not prohibit them, but restricts them to the utmost," it is evidently insinuated that the Church is unfavourable in practice to what she maintains in doctrine. The laws of the Church are stringent, and have often been reiterated by Pontiffs and Synods, not with any view of restraining Masses for the dead, but with the sole view of enforcing their celebration.* The Article completely overlooks any inherent right in the Church to administer her own temporalities according to her own canons.

On the temporal position of the Pope and on his civil administration, not only has the Rambler collected and

* See Ferraris—*Missa prout Sacrificium* Art. 15.

repeated whatever is most hostile to the Sovereign Pontiff, but has stood warmly on the side of his adversaries. Even further, its conductors have done their utmost to put the clergy most distinguished for learning and piety, the Religious Orders and the laity into a balance to weigh against the Pope and the Episcopate; with what success remains to be seen. Moreover it is even insinuated that the Catholic Hierarchy, in their almost universal consent, spoke "because they were especially compelled to speak in support of the word of the Pope," as if the Bishops might have acted from outward compulsion, and not from inward conviction.

In the summary of Current Events of May 1861, the reviewer of those events says:—

"No earnest Catholic could, for religion's sake, accept the complicity of the revolution; and in considering, not the object or the mode, but the result of its action, the utmost he could say was, *Felix culpa*. The time to say it was when the contest was over. In speaking too soon there was a danger of encouraging the design, instead of accepting the event; yet it was equally important that the right moment should not be allowed to go by. It would have been idle to say for the first time after the Pope had left Rome, that it was well he should go."*

So the directors of the Rambler take care to say their *Felix culpa* in good time, whether it does or does not encourage the progress of the revolution. And then by way of justifying their act, and on the plea of quoting the substance of a Lecture by Dr. Döllinger, the correctness of the report of which he afterwards disavowed, they proceed to write passages like the following:—

"The sacrifice of power, like the sacrifice of property, could not be the spontaneous act of the Church. Not a voice was raised within her pale, to weigh spiritual interests against temporal rights. In the midst of the general demonstration, the masters of religious thought maintained an impressive silence. Whilst the body of the faithful gave utterance to an indefinite and therefore an inadequate conviction, the teachers of the Catholic world held aloof. They did not anticipate the decrees of Providence, or set up a higher standard than that by which the Holy See was obliged to regulate its conduct, &c... Yet they did not despair of the wisdom or mercy of God, and did not believe that the trials and changes in the Church were without just reason or providential end. Those who sought for the first signs of the coming light, should have looked to the high places of Theology. There they would have been struck by a strange coincidence of conduct, and by a wonderful unanimity of thought. The Catholic Hierarchy exhibited indeed, an almost

universal agreement in a matter in which they were specially compelled to speak in support of the words of the Pope. Several religious orders were silent because they were not compelled to speak, and because their members would not disengage themselves from the general responsibility, yet even here no serious difference of opinion has been shewn to exist amongst those who are personally most competent to judge." *

Then comes a most unwarrantable use of the name of the Bishop of Orleans, more insulting even to Pius IX. than derogatory to the known sentiment of that illustrious Prelate. And the writer says:—

"The tone of the eloquent and bitter writings of the Bishop of Orleans, is so destitute of applause for the condition of the Church in Rome, as to show that the writer knew its great defects, while he repelled unjust attacks." †

I will not insult the memory of one illustrious religious, and the name of another still living, whom this writer charges, in support of his theme, with "having spoken decidedly against a superstitious reverence for the externals of the Church, a timorous reliance on material advantages, and the dependence of the spiritual on the temporal power." ‡

You have only, Rev. Brethren, to study carefully the multitude and variety of insinuations comprised in the passages I have here quoted, the motives attributed, and the facts assumed, to comprehend with what weapons the Rambler contends on the side of the adversaries of the Holy See. And I will here pause to remark that it is a wont of the writers in this Periodical, when they have to bring forth some position peculiarly offensive to Catholic ears, to intimate that they are secretly supported by some person of great weight for theological learning and piety whose name they feel not at liberty to disclose. With them, the weightiest judgments seem not unfrequently to be rested upon individuals, other than the Pope, as against the common sentiment current amongst the teachers of the Church. Only we are not always privileged to know whom those individuals may be.

I will make a few more extracts from this most uncatholic and disloyal Article. Speaking of the opinions of Brownson, the writer says, that in attributing power to the Pope in the disputes between kings and their subjects, "Brownson forgot that the state is older than the Church, and that political philosophy is altogether independent of Christianity."

* p. 163.

† p. 137.

‡ *ibid.*

Assuredly it is no more a fact that a Christian state is older than the Church, which is the point in question; than it is a sound proposition that the philosophy of Christian policy is altogether independent of Christianity; which again is the point in question. But if the writer would inculcate, as the *Home and Foreign Review* has also in substance inculcated, that the laws of Christianity have nothing to do with the social condition of man; or that there is no connexion between the truths of religion and the conclusions of reason; or that what is religiously true may be philosophically false; or that the natural is not subordinate to the supernatural order; then has he impugned some of the gravest principles of that Theology which the *Rambler* is so fond of invoking. Accept this proposition, and, as we before said, a Christian man must divide his conscience into two, and escape from the responsibility of his Christian conscience as he can by the door of his ungraced natural conscience. For assuredly there is no separating the policy which a man should pursue from his conscience of right and wrong.

Then we have a reference to certain condemned writings of an otherwise illustrious Religious author, yet without the least hint that his writings were condemned, or that the author retracted those writings:—"Where his influence can be most distinctly traced, a sense of the peculiar evils and disorders of the Church in Central Italy prevails over the desire to preserve temporal rights. Several of the Religious Orders feel in like manner." And whence does the writer draw his information? He tells us:—"From the nature of things our knowledge of the sentiments of the Italian clergy rests upon private communications more than on public expressions. It is enough to say in general, that those who know Rome best, are the least disposed to regret the temporal power." And so on the faith of communications inaccessible to the world at large, we are to believe that the abuses within the Italian Church, and especially in Rome, require the destruction of the temporal power. Of the opinions of the sound majority of the clergy of Italy, and of the Religious Orders, let their politically enforced silence, wherever their protests are not heard, their offerings to the Sovereign Pontiff, and their sufferings in his cause be the witnesses.

The writer next turns to the Catholics of England, attributing to the body the exceptional opinions of a small number of its members. Telling the world that "whilst reverence for the Pope in his tribulations is the strongest feeling" we English Catholics have; yet "it is joined to a sense of the

evils which come from the impossibility of adapting the Roman system to the wants of the time, and of an urgent necessity for such a change as that which seems to be at hand." * Then comes one of those sentences so characteristic of the Rambler :—" Yet England is no exception to the general rule, that where the greatest sanctity and the greatest wisdom is united, there is a belief that the revolution which has overthrown the temporal power has been directly a blessing to the Church." †

I have given, my Rev. Brethren, not the sum but samples of the doctrines and sentiments of the Rambler and the Home and Foreign Review. I have quoted the text of their teaching, though my space would not always admit of the commentary. I have added such brief remarks as were requisite to show the antagonism of their sense with that of the Church. I have shown how the Church defends the rights and prerogatives of reason as well as those of faith; and how, in one respect or another, the Rambler has impugned both those of reason and those of faith. Yet insinuations, in the art of which certain of its writers are skilled, are far more copiously poured out than open and defined assertions, and insinuations glide with more subtle and insensible influence into the mind of the reader. The only defence against them is that fine sense of divine truth which is kept in vigour by cultivating the habits of faith and piety. Those insinuations touch upon the doctrines of the Church, upon her policy, and upon the conduct of her pastors. There is also manifested a disposition which takes the practical turn of lowering and weakening the authority of the teaching Church; and, whilst professing all submission to its infallible voice, of contracting the limits of its exercise, and pulling down its representatives in detail. The glorification of those writers has been given to the policy of the world and its science; whilst their keenest admonitions have been aimed at their spiritual instructors. They also delight in using expressions, that shock and startle by their boldness and daring presumption. And they evince a defiant tone of intellectual superiority, more especially in the face of their ecclesiastical teachers. Catholic writing upon Catholic truth inspires that humbleness of heart and that spirit of grace from which it emanates. It gives increase to mental peace from its sweet accord with the inward light of truth. Whilst the effect of this new style is to provoke and trouble the soul. It is like the application of some

* p. 138.

† Ibid.

corrosive mineral, which irritates and distresses the sound and healthy system. Such a style of writing can no more attract the adversary of the Church to the faith than it can confirm the Catholic in the faith. When Cardinal Wiseman uttered his brief but grave remonstrance, knowing and confessing what an accumulation of authority his words represented; from behind the shield of their Review, its conductors declared their unconsciousness of having ever printed a passage in the Rambler or Review that was contrary to the infallible teaching of the Church, or less than devoted to her cause. And that if they have they lament and retract it. Hoping and trusting that those writers are becoming conscious of the uncatholic course which has been pursued; I have nevertheless an obligation upon me regarding their past writings. Printed words abide, and not only may the less wise and learned among the faithful use such as I have quoted, even unconsciously to their detriment; but those who are outside the Church will be apt to take them, appearing in a professedly Catholic Periodical, for an accurate reflection of Catholic doctrine and sentiment.

It is now my duty to write most painful, yet needful words; and to declare that in the Rambler, of which the Home and Foreign Review is a continuation, there are contained propositions which are respectively subversive of the faith, heretical, approaching to heresy, erroneous, derogatory to the teaching Church, and offensive to pious ears. And I have to fulfil my office further, my Rev. Brethren, by reminding you of the duty of guarding the faithful over whose souls you watch, lest, by reading those productions, they imbibe their uncatholic sentiments and their errors.

Praying Almighty God to bless you,

I remain, my Rev. Brethren,

Your faithful Servant in Christ,

✠ W. B. ULLATHORNE.

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